

25. Major Accidents and Natural Disasters

Purpose of the Assessment

- 25.1 Consideration and assessment of expected significant adverse effects of the development on the environment deriving from the vulnerability of the development to risks of relevant major accidents and/or disasters is now required within Environmental Statements (ES). This requirement was introduced as a result of Directive 2014/52/EU and transposed into UK Regulations (in this instance) by the Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 (the EIA Regulations) (see Schedule 4, paras 5(d) and 8). This Chapter within the PEIR is therefore structured as it will be in the final ES.
- 25.2 The definition of a '*major accident*' used in this assessment draws on the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015 (COMAH 2015) (Ref 25.1). These Regulations are regarded as applicable in this context as their purpose is to prevent major accidents involving dangerous substances and limit the consequences to people and the environment of any accidents that do occur. The Regulations define a "*major accident*" as an occurrence such as a major emission, fire, or explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment, and leading to serious danger to human health or the environment (whether immediate or delayed) inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances. The terms which define a major accident are as follows:
- Injury to persons and damage to property –
 - a death;
 - six persons injured within the establishment and hospitalized for at least 24 hours;
 - one person outside the establishment hospitalised for at least 24 hours;
 - a dwelling outside the establishment damaged and unusable as a result of the accident;
 - the evacuation or confinement of persons for more than 2 hours where the value (persons × hours) is at least 500; or
 - the interruption of drinking water, electricity, gas or telephone services for more than 2 hours where the value (persons × hours) is at least 1,000.
 - Immediate damage to the environment:
 - permanent or long-term damage to terrestrial habitats –
 - 0.5 hectares or more of a habitat of environmental or conservation importance protected by legislation; or

- 10 or more hectares of more widespread habitat, including agricultural land.
- significant or long-term damage to freshwater and marine habitats –
 - 10 km or more of river or canal;
 - 1 hectare or more of a lake or pond;
 - 2 hectares or more of delta; or
 - 2 hectares or more of a coastline or open sea; or
 - significant damage to an aquifer or underground water: 1 hectare or more.
- Damage to property.
 - damage to property in the establishment, to the value of at least EUR 2,000,000; or
 - damage to property outside the establishment, to the value of at least EUR 500,000.
- Cross-border damage: any major accident directly involving a dangerous substance giving rise to consequences outside the territory of the Member State concerned.

25.3 Based on professional judgement, vulnerability is defined as the potential weakness of the Proposed Development to the environmental and other risks to which it is exposed. For instance in this context it could be the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to flood risk and how flooding could subsequently result in impacts on human or other environmental receptors. A risk is defined as the consequences of an event (for instance flooding impacts an electrical substation with safety and power supply implications); within the context of how likely it is for that event to take place.

25.4 Based on professional judgement, major accidents or natural disasters are events or situations that have the potential to affect the Proposed Development causing immediate or delayed serious damage to human health, welfare and/or the environment. The assessment considers the risks of major accidents and disasters during construction and operation caused by operational failure or natural hazards.

25.5 Other terms which are used through this assessment are:

Term	Definition (based on professional judgement)
Natural disaster	A naturally occurring event such as extreme weather (storm, flooding) or a ground-related hazard event (subsidence, landslide,

	earthquake) with the potential to cause an event or situation that meets the definition of major accident above.
Risk	The likelihood of an impact occurring combined with the effect or consequence(s) of the impact on a receptor(s) if it does occur.
Risk event	An identified unplanned event from a feature which is considered relevant to the Proposed Development and a potential hazard source and consequence which constitutes a major accident or disaster subject to the identification of its potential to result in a significant adverse effect on a receptor.
Serious damage	Serious damage includes the loss of life, permanent injury and temporary or permanent damage / destruction of an environmental receptor.
Vulnerability	In the context of environmental risk assessment the terms refers to the 'exposure and resilience' of the Proposed Development to the risk of a major accident or natural disaster.

25.6 The assessment of 'significant adverse effects' in relation to the potential for a major accident or disaster includes consideration of all factors identified in the Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 (the 'EIA Regulations') (Ref 25.2) (i.e. population and human health, biodiversity, land, soil, water, air and climate and material assets, cultural heritage and the landscape).

25.7 Drawing from this context, for the Proposed Development, a significant adverse effect is considered to mean the loss of life or permanent injury, and/or permanent or long lasting damage to an environmental receptor. The significance of this effect takes into account the extent, severity and duration of harm and the sensitivity of the receptor.

25.8 The remainder of this chapter covers:

- legislation, policy and best practice;
- scoping and consultation undertaken;
- the study area;
- method of assessment;
- baseline conditions;
- embedded mitigation;
- assessment of the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to major accidents and disasters during:
 - construction;

- Operation; and
- decommissioning
- cumulative effects;
- the measures required to prevent or mitigate the likely significant adverse effects of such events on the environment;
- residual effects;
- monitoring; and
- limitations and assumptions.

25.9 It is recommended that the highways and transportation assessment (**Chapter 19**), flood risk assessment (within the hydrology, drainage and flood risk assessment – **Chapter 14**) and the Utility assessment (**Chapter 15**) are read in conjunction with this assessment to provide a broader context on the risks associated with these aspects.

Legislation, Policy and Best Practice

- 25.10 The EIA Regulations (see Regulation 14, and Schedule 4, paras 5(d) and 8) require that the EIA identifies, describes and assesses the direct and indirect significant effects of the Proposed Development on population and human health, biodiversity, land, soil, water, air and climate, material assets, cultural heritage and landscape and the interaction between these factors, arising from the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to major accidents or disasters that are relevant to the Proposed Development.
- 25.11 In accordance with the EIA Regulations assessments have been undertaken for the Proposed Development to inform the identification and assessment of expected significant adverse effects of the development on the environment deriving from its vulnerability to risks of relevant major accidents and natural disasters.
- 25.12 This has included the identification of measures envisaged to prevent or mitigate such effects and details of the preparedness for and proposed response to such emergencies.
- 25.13 Additionally the Proposed Development is also being designed and its implementation guided by other industry standards and codes, many of which are mandatory. These require infrastructure and systems to be designed so that risks to people and the environment are either eliminated or reduced to levels that are “*as low reasonably practicable*” (ALARP).
- 25.14 This following table identifies the legislative framework relevant to major accidents and disasters. **Table 25.1** shows tabulated information presented in this section. Any licences or permits that would be required to facilitate the Proposed Development in relation to this topic are addressed in other Chapters (**Chapter 14, 15 and 19**).

Table 25.1 Relevant legislation, policy and guidance

Legislation/policy/ guidance	Key provisions
Legislation	<p>Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSWA) (Ref 25.3)</p> <p>Places general duties on employers, people in control of premises, manufacturers and employees. Regulations under this Act also contain more detailed provisions.</p> <p>The Act provides the framework for the regulation of industrial health and safety in the UK.</p> <p>The overriding principle is that foreseeable risks to persons shall be reduced so far as is reasonably practicable and that adequate evidence shall be produced to demonstrate that this has been done.</p>
Legislation	<p>EU Regulation 402/2013 on the Common Safety Method on Risk Evaluation and Assessment (CSM-RA) (as amended by EU Regulation 2015/1136). (Ref 25.4)</p> <p>An EU Regulation that describes the methods required to be used to assess compliance with safety levels and safety requirements.</p>
Legislation	<p>Construction (Design and Management) (CDM) 2015 Regulations (Ref 25.5)</p> <p>These regulations place specific duties on clients, designers and contractors, so that health and safety is taken into account throughout the life of a construction project from its inception to its subsequent final demolition and removal. Under CDM regulations, designers have to avoid foreseeable risks so far as reasonably practicable by: eliminating hazards from the construction, cleaning, maintenance, and proposed use and demolition of a structure; reducing risks from any remaining hazard; and giving collective safety measures priority over individual measures.</p>
Legislation	<p>The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 (as amended) (ROGS) (ref 25.6)</p> <p>ROGS place a duty on Railway Undertakings (RUs) and Infrastructure Managers (IMs) to: develop safety management systems (SMS) that must meet certain requirements; have a safety certificate (for RUs) or a safety authorisation (for IMs); show that they have procedures in place to introduce new or altered vehicles or infrastructure safely; carry out risk assessments and put in place the safety measures they have identified as necessary to make sure that the transport system is run safely; and work together to make sure the transport system is run safely (ROGS regulation 22).</p>

Legislation/policy/ guidance	Key provisions
Legislation	<p>The Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011 (as amended) (RIR). (Ref 25.7)</p> <p>The purpose of the RIR is to establish common operational standards and practices across European railways, including adoption of the CSM-RA.</p>
Guidance	<p>Railway Group Standards (Ref 25.8)</p> <p>The Railway Group Standards set out National Technical Rules and National Safety Rules for the Great Britain mainline railway. Compliance with the National Technical Rules and National Safety Rules is required under the Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011.</p>
Legislation	<p>The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (Ref 25.9)</p> <p>These regulations generally make more explicit what employers are required to do to manage health and safety under the HSWA.</p>
Legislation	<p>The Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 2015 (Ref 25.10)</p> <p>This is required for the presence of certain quantities of hazardous substances. This is a key part of the controls for storage and use of hazardous substances which could, in quantities at or above specified limits, present a major off-site risk.</p>

Legislation/policy/ guidance	Key provisions
Guidance	<p>European Union Guidance 2017 - Environmental Impact of Project Guidance on the preparation of the Environmental Impact Assessment Report (Directive 2011/92/EU as amended by 2014/52/EU)</p> <p>Amongst other matters provides useful guidance on the key changes from Directive 2011/92/EU as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU specifically Annex IV point 8. It states that two key considerations emerge namely: Two key considerations emerge therefrom, namely:</p> <p>The Project's potential to cause accidents and/or disasters; and the vulnerability of the Project to potential disaster/accident.</p> <p>The guidance confirms (see box 16) that disaster/accident risk assessment in EIAs should address issues such as:</p> <p>What can go wrong with a Project?</p> <p>What adverse consequences might occur to human health and to the environment?</p> <p>What is the range of magnitude of adverse consequences?</p> <p>How likely are these consequences?</p> <p>What is the Project's state of preparedness in case of an accident/disaster?</p> <p>Is there a plan for an emergency situation?</p> <p>The guidance goes on to state that after risks have been identified and assessed, measures to control and manage their significant impacts should then be taken, to ensure compliance with existing minimum prevention standards, safety requirements, building codes, improved land use planning, etc. It also states that measures should be captured in a coherent risk management plan that also includes sufficient preparedness and emergency planning measures.</p>

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- 25.15 In addition to the information tabulated above which provides the broad legislative framework, there are numerous other safety related UK Regulations and guidance documents for specific aspects such as rail operations, working on highways and relocating utilities which are relied on in this assessment as being complied with. This would be the responsibility of the party undertaking the relevant aspect of works to do this.

Scoping and Consultation

- 25.16 **Table 25.2** provides a summary of the relevant information within the Scoping Opinion. No additional topic specific consultation has been undertaken in relation to major accidents and

disasters although consideration has been given in relation to consultation feedback received for other relevant topics such as traffic, flooding and utilities.

Table 25.2: Summary of Scoping Opinion

Scoping Opinion section/paragraph	Summary of issues raised	Where in the ES is this addressed?
The Secretary of State	Does not expressly ask for the ES to include an assessment of risks associated with a major accident or disaster although it asks that “the ES submitted by the applicant should demonstrate consideration of the points raised by the consultation bodies”.	Not applicable
National Grid	NG highlighted the presence of various assets within the Proposed Development site. NG confirmed the following design codes should be adhered to: Health and Safety Executives guidance document HS (G) 47 "Avoiding Danger from Underground Services". National Grid’s specification for Safe Working in the Vicinity of National Grid High Pressure gas pipelines and associated installations - requirements for third parties T/SP/SSW22.	Embedded mitigation
Blisworth Parish Council	Major trunk roads will also be impacted, notably the A43 (which is used by local villagers travelling to Towcester for daily shopping) and also the A508 which is a major commuter and business traffic route between Northampton and Milton Keynes as well as a relief route for the M1, both north and southbound. It is already deemed to be at or near capacity with no prospect of near-term alleviation. In the short term, further traffic will be generated by the 400 dwellings either under construction or with planning approval for imminent construction in the village, not to mention two new warehouses on junction 15 and a significant housing project in Collingtree (amongst others).	Embedded mitigation
	The Grand Union canal, which runs along the western edge of the site, appears as Flood Zone 3 on the EA Flood Zone Map for Planning (Rivers and Seas) – this is not mentioned in the Developer’s Application. Flood water entering the canal could have dire consequences over a large distance and needs to be assessed. 12.11 in the Scoping Report application states “small areas of the PDA immediately adjacent to the Milton Malsor Brook are shown to be at an increased risk with some land at high risk and within Flood Zone 3”. The southern and eastern boundaries are rail lines mainly either in cuttings or built up above ground level and the M1 on	Embedded mitigation

	the northern boundary is also below surrounding ground levels. 12.15 states that the underlying geology is “Dyrham Formation and the Whitby Mudstone” and both are “low in permeability”.	
HSE	According to HSE's records there are no major accident hazard installations or pipelines in the vicinity of the infrastructure project and, therefore, we would not wish to comment on the siting of Rail Central. However, as recognised in Section 13 of the applicant's Environmental Statement Scoping Report, the project has the potential to affect existing non-major accident hazard utility services. In particular, the applicant is advised to ensure they consult the British Pipeline Agency Ltd regarding the agency's Kingsbury - Buncefield pipelines which appear to pass under the land.	Similarly our searches have not identified any COMAH facilities within a 3km radius.
	Although the Environmental Statement Scoping Report does not mention hazardous substances, the applicant should note that the presence of hazardous substances on, over or under land at or above set threshold quantities (Controlled Quantities) will probably require Hazardous Substances Consent (HSC) under the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 as amended.	Operational management and controls

Study Area

25.17 The study area(s) has been based on professional judgement, as there is no specific regulatory guidance nor significant precedent / standardised methodology. The following were adopted in the risk assessment to identify potential major accidents and disasters sources:

- Main SFRI site (including A43 access and all rail infrastructure):
 - COMAH facilities within 3 km:
 - Rail infrastructure within 1 km;
 - Connection to existing road infrastructure;
 - Transmission (gas, electrical, oil) crossing the order limits; and
 - Natural features with the potential to create risks within 1 km (chiefly hydrological (flood risk) and geological (seismic activity, unstable ground conditions, contamination).
- J15a works and other minor highway works as detailed in **Chapter 5**;

- M1 J15a;
- A43/Towcester Road/A5 (Tove) roundabout;
- The route from the Main SFRI (along the A43) to the M1; and
- Areas subject to highways improvements / mitigation (as detailed in **Chapter 5**).

Method of Assessment

Overview

- 25.18 The purpose of this Chapter is to identify expected significant effects of the Proposed Development to the environment, which could derive from its vulnerability to risks of major accidents or natural disasters. These have been considered during the construction, operation and maintenance and decommissioning phases of the Proposed Development.
- 25.19 A methodology was adopted to systematically identify potential risks, pathways for adverse effects to occur and suitable controls (for identified risks). This was broadly based on accepted technical risk assessment methods which allow the identification of risks, pathways, sensitive receptors and if required barriers / controls to mitigation risk to an acceptable level (typically referred to 'as low as reasonably practicable' or ALARP).
- 25.20 A review was undertaken of baseline conditions to identify existing facilities or natural features or scenarios (such as flooding) which could lead to risk events with associated major accident or hazard in combination with the Proposed Development. These developments were then screened to identify if any specific risk events required further consideration. This process also identified those, which could be screened out as not having a significant risk to retained proportionality and focus within the assessment.
- 25.21 The screening process considered if the risk event then had a pathway and receptor so that if it occurred it would be expected to result in significant effects of the Proposed Development on the environment:
- The pathway is the route by which the risk event can reach the receptor, for example via the derailment of a train leading to a spill to a water source); and
 - The receptor, which is the specific component of the environment that could be adversely affected, if the source reaches it (e.g. the watercourse).
- 25.22 Risk events which do not have all three components were screened out of further assessment.
- 25.23 The assessment then considered what activities could result in an adverse impact during construction / operation/ decommissioning and what barriers or embedded mitigation are in

place to prevent the source pathway receptor risk from occurring. Finally, the assessment sought to identify any 'escalation factors' which could compromise the integrity of embedded mitigation and therefore any significant residual risks and accordingly the need for further mitigation / monitoring.

- 25.24 This assessment does not explicitly consider the decommissioning stage of the Proposed Development on the basis that the assessment of construction stages effects (and the need for any mitigation) effectively forms a more conservative scenario.

Assessing significance of effect

- 25.25 In the context of this Chapter, typical methods employed within EIA to define significance are not applicable. By definition, a major accident or disaster would be a significant effect on the environment. Accordingly, any risks that could result in a major accident or disaster without suitable mitigation, management or regulatory controls in place will be assessed as significant.

Baseline conditions

- 25.26 The baseline assessment sought to identify features (or sources of risk) within the existing environment that could be sources for major accidents and hazards comprising:

- local features external to the order limits that contribute a potential source of hazard to the Proposed Development;
- existing infrastructure and the built environment;
- baseline major accident and natural disaster risks (that exist with or without the Proposed Development).

- 25.27 The wider PEIR (EIA) topic baselines have been used to consider sensitive receptors at risk from the effects of the Proposed Development deriving from its vulnerability to major accidents or disasters for instance:

- members of the public and local communities;
- the natural environment, including ecosystems, land and soil quality, air quality, surface and groundwater resources and landscape; and the historic environment, including archaeology and built heritage.

- 25.28 The main risk sources identified have been divided into the following categories:

- **Existing infrastructure and facilities** (on both how they may impact the Proposed Development and how the Proposed Development may impact them); and
- **Wider natural disaster and hazard risks** – for instance flood risk.

Existing Infrastructure and Facilities – Main SFRI Site

- 25.29 There are no sites registered under *COMAH Regulations 2015* in proximity to the Main SFRI Site. The closest COMAH registered facility is BP's Northampton Oil Fuel storage/distribution facility, approximately three miles (4.8 km) away. Due to this separation distance, and the fact the Proposed Development is outside of the 'consultation area' for this facility, it not considered a risk source for the Proposed Development.
- 25.30 Other infrastructure features which are external to the Main SFRI site which either cross the site boundary, or are within close proximity include:
- existing rail infrastructure;
 - road infrastructure;
 - oil, gas and electricity transmission;
 - potential presence of unexploded ordnance; and
 - former landfill sites and the potential presence of landfill gas.

Existing Rail Infrastructure

- 25.31 The Main SFRI Site is bound to the south and south-west by the West Coast Main Line (WCML) "fast lines" (also referred to as the London to Rugby Line) and to the east by the WCML "slow lines" (also referred to as the Roade and Rugby New Line or the Northampton Loop). All four lines are electrified with overhead 25kV AC catenary and cleared to W10 loading gauge (loading gauge is the maximum permitted cross-sectional profile of a rail vehicle and its load, and varies across the UK). The four WCML running lines split into two separate routes south of the Main SFRI Site at Roade Cutting, and re-join as a single route at Hilmorton Junction south of Rugby.
- 25.32 The Northampton Loop Line (NLL) defines the majority of the Main SFRI Site's eastern boundary, although some land to the east of the NLL is also included in the Order Limits for footpath creation purposes.

Road Infrastructure

- 25.33 The A43 passes through the Main SFRI Site to the west. Northampton Road/Towcester Road runs through the site from north to south and will require improvement to facilitate the Proposed Development and will be subject to construction and operational HGV traffic. The Proposed Development will necessitate construction work on the M1 motorway and will increase HGV traffic on this road.

National Grid - Gas Pipelines

- 25.34 A 250mm diameter pipe owned by National Grid is currently routed down the Towster Road, which approximately bisects the Main SRFI Site in a north / south orientation. It is proposed that this infrastructure will remain in its current location and also form the gas supply (via tie-ins) for the Main SRFI Site.

Pipelines British Pipeline Agency (BPA) - Fuel Transportation Pipelines

- 25.35 There are currently two major oil pipelines running through the south-west corner of the Main SRFI Site, owned by BPA. These are buried with regular marker posts at property and road boundaries. The pipes rise from beneath the ground to cross the Grand Union Canal at the western boundary of the Main SRFI Site.

Western Power Distribution - Overhead Electrical Transmission Infrastructure

- 25.36 High Voltage and Low Voltage cables owned by Western Power Distribution (WPD) intersect the Main SRFI Site in a number of locations, serving existing dwellings and farms.

Other utilities - Identified but screened out of Further Consideration

- 25.37 The Grand Union Canal (originally named the Grand Junction Canal) runs from north to south and forms part of the south-west boundary of the Main SRFI Site. The canal was constructed between 1793 and 1805 and is a designated Conservation Area.
- 25.38 An Anglian Water Sewage Treatment works (also referred to as Blisworth Water Recycling Centre) is located to the immediate south of the Main SRFI Site.
- 25.39 Various other utilities have been identified within the Proposed Development Order Limits (applicable to the Main SRFI site, the area subject to the Junction 15a works and minor highways works). These includes assets owned / operated by Anglian Water (water supply and sewage), British Telecom, BskyB Telecommunications Ltd (includes Sky Networks) and Instalcom Ltd. These utilities are not thought to generate the potential for a major incident in combination with the Proposed Development (and are not considered further in this Chapter). This is based on the rationale that should a loss of control occur for one of these assets it is not probable it would lead to an event considered or a major accident or natural disaster within the terms of this chapter. Additionally all of these utilities are subject to controls such as protective provisions, design codes, notification /consultation process. They will also be considered during the development of the Project design with the objective of allowing the continued safe and effective function of these utilities in accordance with applicable regulatory and design requirements.
- 25.40 The above features have been considered where appropriate throughout design development.

Existing Infrastructure and Facilities – J15a works

25.41 Beyond the NLL lies agricultural land and the M1 Motorway. Junction 15 of the M1 motorway is located approximately 1.17 km from the eastern boundary of the Main SRFI Site. This junction effectively connects the M1 Motorway with local roads including the A43 and the A5143. Other infrastructure in this area includes:

- Western Power Distribution overhead and buried electrical transmission infrastructure;
- British Telecoms and other communications infrastructure;
- National Grid gas transmission infrastructure and local gas distribution (Cadent); and
- Anglian water and waste water pipelines.

Wider natural disaster and hazard risks (Applicable to both the Main SRFI Site and the Land Subject to the Junction 15a Works)

25.42 Major accident and disaster risks relevant to the baseline in the absence of the Proposed Development include extreme weather events, associated flooding, road traffic collisions and rail accidents. Baseline 'without project' conditions are described in the relevant Chapters for highways and transportation, hydrology, drainage and flood risk and climate change. A non-specialist Unexploded Ordinance (UXO) screening exercise undertaken by Hydrock (presented in **Appendix 13.1**) indicates a low bomb risk for the Main SRFI Site. This risk source has therefore not been considered further (although it would be an expectation that a suitable management plan is in place should UXOs be identified during construction).

25.43 The Main SRFI Site is shown by the EA's Flood Zone Mapping to be predominantly within Flood Zone 1 (land assessed as having a less than 1 in 1,000 annual probability of river or sea flooding in any year (<0.1%)). However, small areas of the site immediately adjacent to the Milton Malsor Brook, in proximity to the Grand Union Canal (in the west) and an unnamed watercourse are shown to be at an increased risk with some land categorised as being at medium and high risk.

25.44 Land within the proposed Order Limits is not affected by significant geological hazards (for instance seismic risk), but, due to former activities on the Main SRFI Site (specifically landfills) pollutants may have impacted surface materials / soils and ground water and hence risk arising from contamination are considered. There is no evidence of a coal mine in the Study Area and no active mineral extraction within 1000 m of the Proposed Development. As such, risks associated with this have not been considered further.

Minor highway works

- 25.45 Various minor highways works are proposed (see **Chapter 5**). It is probable that for all of the areas subject to these minor works utilities will be present and there will be some risks associated with construction works along operational roads, both to site workers and the public. However, as these works are of a minor scale and risks can be managed in accordance with the adoption of nationally accepted methods, they are not considered further (explicitly) in this chapter.

Embedded Mitigation

Management Framework Overview

- 25.46 The management framework for the Proposed Development would be defined by a number of mechanisms, including Development Consent Order (DCO) requirements in addition to applicable UK regulations and guidance applicable to construction activities. These would serve to control identified risks including those arising from major accidents and natural disasters.
- 25.47 Ashfield Land Management Limited and Gazeley GLP Northampton s.à.r.l. is a development management company who specialise in the delivery of property across retail, housing, storage and distribution and specialist projects. The Applicants' role in ensuring a safety facility is to set the terms of reference for construction contractor and operational companies to perform within. At this stage all of the details of the future ownership, management and operational parties within the site are not known. However, a statutory compliance and adherence to common industry good practice is considered as an appropriate minimum operational standard.

Construction Management Framework (all phases)

- 25.48 The Proposed Development involves the management of construction for a number of distinct development types all with specific regulatory / design requirements and varied approach to management. Ashfield Land Management Limited and Gazeley GLP Northampton s.à.r.l., and their Project Manager(s) will establish roles, responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities in advance of the construction phase and these will be embedded within the construction contract performance requirements. All works will be carried out in accordance with the conditions attached to any granted DCO (including the submissions made to discharge the requirements of) and applicable law.
- 25.49 The construction period will have the greatest level of interaction with the identified baseline risk sources. This is as a result of third party infrastructure requiring relocation or amendment to facilitate the Proposed Development. It is currently expected that all relocation works of third party infrastructure will either be undertaken and contracted directly by the Statutory undertaker or undertaken by approved contractors to a standard appropriate for the Statutory undertaker. The works required in terms diversions and relocation are not uncommon activities. It is understood that the owners of the

infrastructure will have effective management controls and processes which will have to be adopted when implementing this Proposed Development.

- 25.50 It is also recognised that the construction phase has the potential to be running concurrently with site operations. The contractors appointed to implement the construction will have to adapt to this changing environment and maintain a safe environment. Active risk management is considered to be standard industry approach as is implementing construction projects within an operational site.
- 25.51 Any works on, or within the easement of, utilities (for instance gas or electrical transmission assets or within their assessment) will be undertaken in accordance with the requirements of the applicable utility company (for instance Western Power Distribution for electrical transmission lines) and in accordance with applicable national design codes / regulations.
- 25.52 All works in proximity to, or effecting existing road or rail infrastructure will be only undertaken subject to obtaining the appropriate approval from the appropriate body (for instance the Highways Agency for main roads) and in accordance with applicable national design codes / regulations.
- 25.53 Construction activities will be managed so that staff are cognisant and controls are in place to suitably protect environmental receptors and the risk the natural environment might create for the Proposed Development; for instance flood risk.
- 25.54 Construction activities will accord with HSE Guidance in relation to *Fire Safety in Construction* (ref 25.11).

Operational management and controls

- 25.55 In Britain, rail freight is a private sector activity. Unlike the vast majority of passenger rail services where private companies run services under a franchise arrangement with Department for Transport (DfT), rail freight is a commercial service provided by private freight train operating companies for corporate customers. In the case of the Proposed Development, Ashfield Land Management Limited and Gazeley GLP Northampton s.à.r.l. will manage the SRFI with private rail freight train operators using the facilities (to move material on/off the rail network and for interim storage facilities). The Government's role in rail freight is to set the safety and regulatory environment.
- 25.56 Network Rail is the owner and operator of the commercial track infrastructure in Great Britain. The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) is the industry's economic and safety regulator. ORR has a specific duty to protect the interests of all rail users of the railway network. This includes the protection and enhancement of the rail network and services for freight. ORR also considers applications for freight train operator licences and considers track access agreements (to timed slots on the rail network to run freight trains) and sets the programme of track access charges between freight train operating companies and Network Rail.

- 25.57 Freight services will be provided by suitably approved and regulated Freight Operating Company (FOCs). Additionally, Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) often act as intermediaries between shippers and freight operating companies.
- 25.58 Any works on, or within the easement of, utilities (for instance gas or electrical transmission assets or within their assessment) will be undertaken in accordance with the requirements of the applicable utility company (for instance Western Power Distribution for electrical transmission lines) and in accordance with applicable national design codes / regulations.
- 25.59 All works in proximity to, or effecting existing road or rail infrastructure will be only undertaken subject to obtaining the appropriate approval from the appropriate body (for instance the Highways Agency for main roads) and in accordance with applicable national design codes / regulations. The precise materials (in terms of their classification; for instance hazardous or non-hazardous) to be imported into, stored and shipped to and from the Main SRFI Site has yet to be defined, as this will be subject to the operators that chose to take facilities within the development. That said, all operators will have to maintain statutory compliance within the Proposed Development with controls specific to the materials they are responsible for. Therefore should hazardous substances or those that require regulation under COMAH 2015 be stored on site, the appropriate permits, approvals and operating practices would have to be implemented by the relevant operator. Additionally a Facilities Management Plan will address how operational mitigation (for example, storage of materials, and segregation of waste) will work in practice. It is considered likely that the Facilities Management Plan will be secured by DCO Requirement.
- 25.60 The site drainage can be designed to allow suitable retention of fire water/foams used in an emergency to be retained and thereby minimise discharges to the surrounding environment.

Assessment of Construction Phase Effects

- 25.61 Major accidents and natural disasters to which the Proposed Development may be vulnerable during construction and the outcomes of the assessment are summarised in **Table 25.3**. Each specific "area" of the Proposed Development has been considered, both separately and together (i.e. all development within the Order Limits as a whole), namely:
- Main SRFI site (including A43 access and all rail infrastructure);
 - J15a works; and
 - Minor highway works.
- 25.62 All risk events identified have been considered, but only those, which could impact a receptor and have the potential to be a major accident or disaster, have been included within the assessment.
- 25.63 The table also includes the management and mitigation measures embedded in the project to reduce these risks to as low as reasonably practicable. In all cases, compliance with legal

and regulatory requirements is assumed, as outlined in the Embedded Mitigation section above.

Table 25.3: Construction Phase Screening, Risk events and Mitigation and Management Measures

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation and Risk Management	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Existing Infrastructure and Facilities				
BPA Fuel Transmission – oil carried in the pipeline	Pipeline rupture	<p>Release of oil. Potential for fire / explosion affecting neighbouring property and or members of the public.</p> <p>Release of oil – potential for pollution of soils / controlled water with secondary environmental impacts; for instance on natural habitats /species.</p>	<p>The existing buried pipeline is delineated with regular markers posts at property and road boundaries. Its precise location and depth will be verified with the owner prior to commencement of works.</p> <p>A diversion of the pipeline will be within the DCO Order Limit. Effective demarcation of the pipeline will be in place throughout construction. All contracting parties on site will be informed of the pipeline and its location (pre and post diversion).</p> <p>Relocation work will either be undertaken by the Statutory undertaker (or approved contactor) and will be controlled by standard operating practices and managed in line with appropriate regulations. All BPA design codes will be adhered to and once relocated the Proposed Development will have no building / significant planting within the wayleave. The DCO will secure various areas of planting and landscaping. Specifications will be developed to define suitable species for planting within the easement.</p>	Develop and agree with relevant third parties (i.e. emergency services, Local Planning Authority, statutory undertakers and Environment agency) an emergency response plan for construction phase to minimise the consequences should the risk occur.

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation and Risk Management	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Gas Transmission infrastructure – medium pipeline	Pipeline rupture	Potential for fire / explosion affecting neighbouring property and or members of the public, infrastructure and with secondary environmental impacts.	<p>Maintenance of an easement zone for the pipeline.</p> <p>Any diversion of the pipelines will be within the DCO order limit. Effective demarcation of the pipeline will be in place throughout construction. All contracting parties on site will be informed of the pipeline and its location (pre and post diversion).</p> <p>Relocation work will either be undertaken by the Statutory undertaker (or approved contactor) and will be controlled by standard operating practices and managed in line with appropriate regulations.</p> <p>No building or unsuitable planting over the pipelines.</p> <p>The DCO will secure various areas of planting and landscaping. Specifications will be developed to define suitable species for planting within the easement.</p>	Develop and agree with relevant third parties (i.e. emergency services, Local Planning Authority, statutory undertakers and Environment agency) an emergency response plan for construction phase to minimise the consequences should the risk occur.

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation and Risk Management	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Electrical WPD Overhead Line (OHL) electrical transmission infrastructure	Construction plant collision risk or incidents during the processing of undergrounding.	Potential for injuries / fatality	<p>Maintenance of an easement zone around electrical transmission lines.</p> <p>Any diversion of OHL will be within the DCO order limit. Effective demarcation of the OHL will be in place throughout construction. All contracting parties on site will be informed of the OHL and its location (pre and post diversion).</p> <p>Relocation work will either be undertaken by the Statutory undertaker (or approved contactor) and will be controlled by standard operating practices and managed in line with appropriate regulations.</p> <p>No building or unsuitable planting in the vicinity of the OHL.</p> <p>The DCO will secure various areas of planting and landscaping. Specifications will be developed to define suitable species for planting within the easement.</p> <p>In accordance with the CDM regulations (Ref 25.5) suitable provision will be developed to avoid collisions with OHLs during construction.</p>	None at this stage

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation and Risk Management	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Existing rail infrastructure (WCML & NLL)	Train derailment or incidents associated with the interface between construction and existing rail assets.	Potential damage to equipment and potential for fatalities	<p>Working on or near an existing railway is managed in accordance with established industry procedures. CDM (Ref 25.5) will identify specific risks to be managed.</p> <p>Emergency procedures for works on the existing railway network will be in accordance with established industry procedures.</p> <p>Risks managed via CDM (Ref 25.5): risks assessed and managed as part of construction planning; risk management options may include speed restrictions in work areas, lifting plans. Consultation with NR and rail service providers.</p> <p>Rules for working adjacent to existing railway are very strict. Possessions or speed restrictions will be required. Properties adjacent to WCML have a benchmark risk level.</p> <p>Maintain close dialogue with Network Rail, ORR and FOCs during construction to maintain compliance with guidance and requirements.</p>	None at this stage

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation and Risk Management	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
	Proximity to live rail	Potential for injury to persons / fatality	Standard industry practice preventing access to live rail area without appropriate clearance and competence will be adhered to and above measures.	None at this stage
Roads works and improvements	Construction work on roads already subject to high traffic flows.	Major road traffic accident resulting in death or permanent injury to members of public.	<p>A suitably qualified and experienced contractor (likely to be preapproved by the highways authority) will be appointed to complete the construction works.</p> <p>Construction traffic movements will be controlled as part of the Construction Phase Plan. The plan, in compliance with CDM 2015 Regulation 27 (Ref 25.5), will contain detailed provisions to control the works and will be agreed with external statutory stakeholders prior to commencement.</p>	
Works on junction M1 15a	Construction work on an operational motorway.	Injury or fatality to a member of the public and/or construction workers.	<p>A suitably qualified and experienced contractor (likely to be preapproved by the highways authority) will be appointed to complete the construction works.</p> <p>Construction traffic movements will be controlled as part of the Construction Phase Plan. The plan, in compliance with CDM 2015 Regulation 27 (Ref 25.5), will contain detailed provisions to control the works and will be agreed with external statutory stakeholders prior to commencement.</p> <p>Risk to public road users addressed via consultation on design with Highways England, through design and in construction method statements.</p>	

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation and Risk Management	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Additional HGV traffic on road network	Additional HGV traffic mixing with other road users.	Injury or fatality to a member of the public	Construction traffic movements will be controlled as part of the Construction Phase Plan. The plan, in compliance with CDM 2015 Regulation 27 (Ref 25.5), will contain detailed provisions to control the works and will be agreed with external statutory stakeholders prior to commencement.	None at this stage
Ground contamination and landfill gas	Controlled waters / site works	Site works exposed to material injurious to health, dust carried contaminants impact local resident or controlled waters are impacted.	<p>The Main SRFI Site has been subject to thorough characterisation. Construction will be in accordance with agreed method statement and risks assessments (including the construction environmental management plan and the code of construction practice).</p> <p>Building design will respond to the potential presence of ground gases in accordance with applicable design standards.</p>	

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation and Risk Management	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Grand Union Canal and Milton Malsor brook	Flood	Potential for site to be flooded	Site is predominantly within Flood Zone 1 and for works in this area construction method statement (including the construction environmental management plan and the code of construction practice) will include measures envisaged to prevent or mitigate the significant adverse effects of such events and details of the proposed response to such emergencies'	
Asbestos	Uncontrolled damage to existing infrastructure	Exposure of construction workers	<p>The Main SRFI Site has been subject to thorough characterisation. Construction will be in accordance with agreed method statement and risks assessments.</p> <p>Building design will respond to the potential presence of ground gases in accordance with applicable design standards.</p>	None at this stage

Environmental Hazards

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation and Risk Management	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Flood Risk	Presence of construction materials, equipment and potential contaminants.	Release of contaminants onto environmental receptors (for instance surface water (rivers) or ground water) outside construction site	<p>The draft code of construction practice (CoCP) includes measures for contractors to manage risks of pollution due to severe weather events.</p> <p>The draft CoCP states, as appropriate, that stockpiles and mounds will be kept away from sensitive receptors, watercourses and surface drains where reasonably practicable, and sited to take into account the predominant wind direction relative to sensitive receptors.</p>	Develop and agree with relevant third parties (i.e. emergency services, Local Planning Authority, statutory undertakers and Environment agency) an emergency response plan for construction phase to minimise the consequences should the risk occur.
	Flooded land	Damage to equipment and risks to site workers.	Method statement will detail requirements and safe methods of working for these areas.	
Geotechnical Hazards - landfill to the north of the site, backfill of pit in the north-east of the site	Existing ground contamination	Potential harm to people and the environment	The Main SRFI Site has been subject to thorough characterisation. Construction will be in accordance with agreed method statement and risks assessments.	

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation and Risk Management	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Fire risk	Risk of fire ignition from construction works	Use of fire water/foams and subsequent discharge to the surrounding environment Human health and loss of life	Adherence to HSE guidance on <i>Fire Safety in Construction</i> (Ref 25.11).	Develop and agree with relevant third parties (i.e. emergency services, Local Planning Authority, statutory undertakers and Environment agency) an emergency response plan for construction phase to minimise the consequences should the risk occur.

Assessment of Operational Phase Effects

25.64 Major accidents and natural disasters to which the Proposed Development may be vulnerable during operation and the outcomes of the assessment are summarised in **Table 25.4** Each specific "area" of the Proposed Development has been considered, both separately and together (i.e. all development within the Order Limits as a whole), namely:

- Main SFRI site (including A43 access and all rail infrastructure);
- J15a works; and
- Other minor highway works.

25.65 All risk events identified have been considered, but only those, which could impact a receptor and have the potential to be a major accident have been included within the assessment.

25.66 The table also includes the management and mitigation measures embedded in the project to reduce these risks to as low as reasonably practicable. In all cases, compliance with legal and regulatory requirements is assumed as outlined in the Embedded Mitigation section.

Table 25.4: Operational Phase Screening, Risks and Mitigation

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Existing Infrastructure and Facilities				
Utilities infrastructure (including BPA pipeline)	Easement of infrastructure encroached and containment breached.	Potential harm to people and the environment	All Proposed Development plans will identify easements in place and methods of working to be adopted should works be required in these areas. No unsuitable planting or buildings will be progressed over (or under) the infrastructure.	Develop and agree with relevant third parties (i.e. emergency services, Local Planning Authority, statutory undertakers and Environment Agency) an emergency response plan for the operational phase to minimise the consequences should the risk occur.
The Proposed Development interface with rail infrastructure (WCML & NNL)	Train derailment / collision	Off-track and outside boundary derailment causing severe disruption to rail transportation, major accident causing harm to staff, passengers and adjacent receptors.	<p>The Proposed Development's interface between freight operating companies and logistic service providers will be defined in accordance with Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) requirements and standards. Emergency response procedures and plans will be developed and will in all likelihood form an annex to the Facility Management Plan.</p> <p>The ORR will only authorise the interface of the Main SRFI with existing rail infrastructure before it is placed into</p>	

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
			service, on the basis of an accepted and independently assessed application of the Common Safety Method for Risk Assessment (CSM-RA) (which therefore must ensure that all risks are mitigated to be ALARP). Without this authorisation, the Proposed Development would not be granted a licence to operate.	
Operational Traffic on A43.	Incident associated with operational HGV or light goods vehicles (LGVs) or cars.	<p>Injury or fatality to a member of public.</p> <p>Spillage of pollutants.</p>	<p>Operational traffic will be controlled and regulated in accordance with an Operational Traffic Management Plan for the Main SRFI Site. A framework for this plan is provided within Appendix 19.4.</p> <p>It will be necessary for management procedures to respond to the varying characteristics of the road network and accordingly adapt the provisions of the management system so that it remains cognisant of varying risk profiles.</p>	

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Additional traffic at J15a of M1.	Incident associated with operational HGV or LDVs.	Injury or fatality to a member of public. Spillage of pollutants.	Operational traffic will be controlled, regulated and monitored in accordance with a management plan for the Main SRFI Site. It will be necessary for management procedures to respond to the varying characteristics of the road network and accordingly adapt the provisions of the management system so that it remains cognisant of varying risk profiles.	
Potential (unidentified) storage and transfer of hazardous materials.	Loss of containment and incident for instance a fire.	Releases effect natural and anthropogenic receptors including site works / members of the public.	All operators expected to ensure their own legal compliance with all regulations – i.e. COMAH 2015 (Ref 25.1), Hazardous Substance Consent (Ref 25.10))	Develop and agree with relevant third parties (i.e. emergency services, Local Planning Authority, statutory undertakers and Environment agency) an emergency response plan for operational phase to minimise the consequences should the risk occur.

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Loss of electrical power supply.	Control system within storage facilities or rail interface malfunction.	Releases effects natural and anthropogenic receptors including site works / members of the public.	All operators expected to maintain their own legal compliance and risk based management systems within the regulatory framework and have appropriate insurance.	
Flood Risk	Extreme Weather (fluvial and pluvial events).	Damage to asset or containment within the DCO order limits.	To manage operational flood risks various measures (or mitigation) are proposed in Chapter 14; Hydrology . In summary a surface water drainage system will intercept flows and provide a restricted outfall to surrounding networks. On site attenuation (both above and below ground) has been design to allow the achievement of these restricted flows in all modelled conditions.	Develop and agree with relevant third parties (i.e. emergency services, Local Planning Authority, statutory undertakers and Environment agency) an emergency response plan for operational phase to minimise the consequences should the risk occur.
	Land use change has potential to increase flood pattern in area.	Secondary effects on offsite environmental or anthropogenic receptors.		

Feature	Hazard source	Consequence	Embedded Mitigation	Additional recommendation to reduce risk further
Fire Risk	Operations within industrial land use facilities	<p>Use of fire water/foams, which could be released into the surrounding environment with potential secondary effects.</p> <p>Risk to human health/loss of life</p>	<p>All building materials to be suitably fire rated in accordance with regulations and guidance.</p> <p>All operations to be undertaken in accordance with regulatory requirements.</p> <p>The drainage network will be designed with a retention facility to reduce the pollutant hazard from fire water/foams if used on site entering the surrounding environment.</p>	Develop and agree with relevant third parties (i.e. emergency services, Local Planning Authority, statutory undertakers and Environment agency) an emergency response plan for operational phase to minimise the consequences should the risk occur.

Assessment of Decommissioning Phase Effects

- 25.67 It is not known when there will no longer be a need for the Proposed Development and many elements of the development are unlikely to be decommissioned at all. The design life of the warehousing buildings will be in the order of 60+ years (approximately), and the rail infrastructure and civil engineering works will be significantly longer than this. Once the warehouses reach their design life, it is entirely feasible that they will be re-provided in a modern form. Should that occur it would be subject to its own assessment of effects at the relevant time.
- 25.68 Predicting the baseline so far into the future to enable a meaningful assessment of the sensitivity of the environment, and the significance of effects from the decommissioning of the Proposed Development is extremely difficult.
- 25.69 When and if the development is decommissioned, the appropriate environmental assessments will be undertaken to identify any significant environmental effects and propose suitable mitigation methods. Notwithstanding this, professional judgement suggests that it is likely that the effects will be similar to, or less than, those experienced during the construction phase.
- 25.70 Accordingly, this Chapter will not specifically identify and assess the risk arising from major accidents and natural disasters during the decommissioning phase of the project beyond those, which will be broadly similar to the construction phase; for instance risk associated with utilities and flooding. It is improbable that natural risks would have worse significance (flood risk considers and allows for climate change) and geological risk will be as they are for baseline, if not improved following remediation measures.

Cumulative Effects

Intra-Project Effects

- 25.71 This assessment has by its very nature implicitly considering integrations between components of the Proposed Development and hence no further assessment of this aspect is proposed.

Cumulative Assessment: Inter-Project Effects

- 25.72 Cumulative risks with other projects are not considered to escalate the likelihood of major accidents or natural disasters from or to the Proposed Development. The principal risks identified and assessed identified are within the Order Limits. Other projects may cumulatively increase the use of highways and the rail network (for example, Northampton Gateway, the proposed SRFI site adjacent to Rail Central to the east), but the management and control of the risk of accidents within this context is controlled by the highways authorities and rail network operator. Nonetheless, the Applicant would, subject to the granting of the DCO and the commencement of

construction, liaise with the proponents of these schemes to controls cumulative risks in addition to control established by any granted DCOs.

Mitigation

- 25.73 The mitigation required to manage the potential major accident or natural disaster risks are either integrated into the design of the scheme or considered to be a regulatory or industry standard practice requirement and thus considered 'embedded' mitigation. There is a recommendation that emergency response plans are developed with third parties to further reduce the likelihood of adverse effects occurring.

Residual Effects

- 25.74 Given the embedded mitigation and management procedures it is considered that the likely risks associated with risk events occurring will be managed to be ALARP. The application of the ALARP principle for the management of railway safety risks has been accepted by the regulator (ORR) and the Health and Safety Executive.
- 25.75 Additionally, given baseline conditions within the study area and embedded mitigation the Proposed Development vulnerability to major accidents and disasters is not considered to be high and thus significant effects are not considerable to be probable.
- 25.76 Accordingly, it is considered that there will not be any likely significant environmental effects arising from the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to major accidents and natural disasters.

Monitoring

- 25.77 The effective management and monitoring of risks is best done through a systematic hazard identification and review process. It is recommended that Ashfield Land Management Limited and Gazeley GLP Northampton s.à.r.l. maintain an effective compliance and peer review process for the site operations that come forward to effectively track and monitor potential major hazard risks from the operations within the Proposed Development potentially as part of the Facilities Management Plan.

Limitations and Assumptions

- 25.78 Environmental effects associated with unplanned events that do not meet the definition of major accidents and/or natural disaster (e.g. minor leaks and spills that may be contained within construction sites are addressed in the topic Chapters and not in this section). It is also recognised that the management framework for the Proposed Development is not fully defined at this stage. However, a presumption of standard practice and regulatory compliance within the adopted management framework has been assumed. Additionally as the order is drafted (assumed to be

submitted with the ES) the need for specific plans, for instance the COCP, CEMP and facilities management plan, will be secured by DCO requirements.

Exclusions

25.79 The following effects are considered to be outwith the terms of this assessment:

- Effects on members of the public who wilfully trespass onto railway or other land (for instance junction 15a works) within the Order Limits both during construction and operation. The Proposed Development will include control and mitigation to reduce risks of trespass and the secondary safety implementation to ALARP. It is beyond the remit of this Chapter to fully detail all of the controls that will be embedded in construction work sites and the Main SRFI site but they will include controls such as boundary fencing, warning signs and security.
- Risk events that only affect Ashfield Land Management Limited and Gazeley GLP Northampton s.à.r.l. (e.g. cost, time, programme).

References

- 25.1: The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015, Health and Safety Executive
- 25.2: Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017
- 25.3: Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. SI 1974 c.37. Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London.
- 25.4: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 402/2013 of 30 April 2013 on the common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment and repealing Regulation (EC) No 352/2009. Official Journal of the European Union.
- 25.5: The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015. SI 2015 No. 51. Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London
- 25.6: The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006. SI 2006 No. 599. Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London. Available online at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/599/pdfs/ukxi_20060599_en.pdf
- 25.7: The Railways (Interoperability) Regulations 2011 (as amended) (RIR). These regulations implement the EU Railway Interoperability Directive 2008/57/EC
- 25.8: RSSB (undated), Standards and the rail industry
- 25.9: The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. SI 1999 No. 3242. Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London.
- 25.10: The Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 2015
- 25.11: HSE guidance on Fire Safety in Construction, 2010, HSG168